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THE l~STITUTIONS OF INNOCENCE REVIEW: A
COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Jessica A. Roth*

.ABSTRACT

The last three decades have seen the rise of an international
innocence movement that has forced participants in diverse
criminal justice systems to confront their systems' fallibility,
previously thought more 'theoretical th,an real. The public
acknowledgment of that fallibility has 1led to the creation of new
institutional mechanisms to re-examine old convictions. This
short essay prepared for a symposium issue of the Rutgers
University Law Review on the theory of criminal law reform
compares the error correction institutions created in the United
Kingdom, Canada, and the United States, three Englishspeaking countries with commQn law roots and an adversarial
structure, through the lens of sociological theory. It finds that,
consistent with what that literature suggests, the institutions
creaied in each country refl,ect the circumstances in which
'fonocence consciousness" arose therein and the pre-existing
institutional arrangements and cultural frames. This analysis
offers valuable insights for reformers around the world who are
considering how to address wrongful convictions.
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INTRODUCTION
•I

The story 9f the worldwide "innocence revolution" has now been
frequently told. 1 For example, in the United States, for centuries the idea
that an innocent ,person could be wrongly convicted was largely a
theoretical con~t11:1~t to justify exacting standards of proof and procedural
protections for the rights of the accused:2 Occasionally,,scholars pointed
to cases suggestir}.g that an innocent person in fact had been wrongly
convicted. 3 Bl,!t it was not until the mid 1990s, when lawyers started to
use DNA analysis to regularly exonerate people of cpmes for which many
had served decades in prison, that wrongful convictions became
irrefutable. 4 Suddel}ly, the "unreal dream'.' of the wrongfully convicted
innocent peri:ion was \lnreal no more. Since 1989, at least 362 people have
been exon~rated through DNA evidence in tJie United States alone. 5 The
National ~egistry·of Exonerations, a joint project of the University of
California Irvine, the University of Michigan Law School, and Michigan

,
See, e.g., Mark A. Godsey & Thomas Pulley, The Innocence Revolution and Our
"Evolving Standards of Decency" in Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV.
265 (2004); Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO
1.

ST. .J. CRIM. L. 573 (2004).
2. As Judge Learned Hand famously wrote in 1923, "Our procedure has been always
haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream." United States
v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
3. See, e.g., EDWIN M. BORCHARD WITH E. RUSSELL LUTZ, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT:
SIXTY•FlvE ACTUAL ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE {1932).
4. The first DNA exoneration in the United States occurred in 1989. Additional
exonerations followed steadily thereafter, reaching a peak of 25 in 2002. From 2004 to 2009,
number of DNA exonerations per year in the United States ranged between 13 and 23.
Keith A. Findley, Innocence Fou./,,d; The New Revolution in American Criminal Justice, in
CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 3, 4 (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed., 2014).
5. Exonerate
the
Innocent,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/exonerate/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2019) (reporting 362 total
DNA exonerations since 1989).
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State University College of Law, lists over 2,252 exonerations. 6
Extrapolating from the known data, some scholars have estimated that
the number of number of wrongful convictions in the United States is
considerably farger. 7 The United States is now home to a network oflocal
innocence projects, many of them non-profit organizations based at law
schools, together serving every region of the country. 8 Similar
organizations working to free the wrongfully convicted exist around the

6. About, NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2019) (listing 2,276 exonerations in the
United States since 1989). Perhaps not surprisingly, what counts as an exoneration or a
wrongful, erroneous, or false conviction is a hotly contested subject. See, e.g., Gould & Leo,
supra note 6, at 832 (distinguishing between procedural error and factual innocence);
Joshua Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 501, 508 (2005)
(suggesting that "[t]o call someone 'innocent' when all they managed to do was wriggle
through some procedural cracks in the justice system cheapens the word and impeaches
the iii.oral authority of those who claim that a person has been 'exonerated.•1, The National
Registry of Exonerations defines an "exoneration" to include" circumstances in which a person has been "(l) declared to be factually innocent by a government official or agency with
the authority to make that declaration; or (2) relieved of all the consequences of the criminal
conviction by a government official or body with the authority to take that action." Glossary,
NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2019) (defining 'an exO'neration for purposes
of the registry). The official action can include a pardon, acquittal, or dismissal if it was
''the result, at least in part, of evidence of innocence" that was not presented at the defendant's earlier trial or known at the time that a plea was entered, although this evidence
"need not be an explicit basis for the official action that exonerated the person." Id. A person
who otherwise meets the Registry's defmition will notrbe deemed "exonerated" where "there
is unexplained physical evidence of that person's guilt." Id. For a discussion of the benefits
and risks associated with the National Registry's definition, see Richard A. Leo, Has the
Innocence Movement Become an Exoneration Movement, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND
THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 66, 66--73 (Daniel
S. Medwed ed., 2017).
7. As Dan Simon has observed, the "true number of false convictions is unknown and
frustratingly unknowable." DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PROCESS 4 (2012). However, several scholars have estimated that there is a 3% to
5% error rate. See Marvin Zalman et al., Measuring Wrongful Conviction, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8047 (G. Bruinsma and D. Weisburd eds., 2014)
(surveying studies); Gould & Leo, supra note 6, at 832 (surveying studies); Samuel R. Gross
et al., Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants who are Sentenced to Death, 111
PROC. NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI. 7280 (2014) (estimating a 4.1% error rate for defendants
sentenced to death in the United States between 1978 and 2004). Comparison of the
existing studies is complicated by the lack of a uniform definition of what counts as a false
or wrongful conviction. See discussion supra note 6.
8. See Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Innocence Network: From Beginning to Branding,
in CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 21, 22-29 (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed.,
2014). There are approximately 56 innocence organizations currently operating in the
United States. See About the Innocence Network, INNOCENCE NETWORK,
http://innocencenetwork.org/about_(last visited Feb. 17, 2019).
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globe.9 Many are participants in an international Innocence Network, a
loosely affiliated network guided by an Executive Board, with
membership organizations in North America, South America, Europe,
Africa, and Australia. 10 A full-fledged global "innocence movement"comprised of "[a] conglomeration of.advocacy organizations, lawyers and
legal activistsi exonerees and their families, journalists, students, and
legal practitioners who believe that wrongful convictions are common
and deserve attention on a large sqale"1L-has _emerged, described by
some as the "civil rights movement of the twenty-first century."12
Not surprisingly, the institutional responses by different legal
systems to that movement have been varied. Several countries have
created p.ew official institutions charged with re-examining old
convictions. In 1995, the United Kingdom becall}e the first Western
democracy to create such an entity, when Parliament passed legislation
creating the independent Criminal Cases Review Commissioq ("CCRC')
to review cases in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. 18 The CCRC
started operations in 1997, charged with reviewing convictions and
referring th.ose ,with "a real possibility" of reversal to the U.K. Court of
Appeals. 14 Scotland, which has a separate legal system, established a
similar entity, which began operations in 1999.15
In the United States, where most criminal law is handled at the state
and local level, one state, North Carolina, established a CCRC-type
commission in 2006 to review claims for factual innocence. 1,6 Although
several states have established commissions to study underlying causes
9. See Mark Godsey, The Global Innocence Movement, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FlVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 356, 356
(Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017) (noting that there are innocence organizations "on every
inhabited continent.").
10. See
About
the
Innocence
Network,
INNOCENCE
NETWORK,
http://innocencenetwork.org/about_(last visited Feb~ 17, 2019).
]J. ROBERT J. NORRIS, EXONERATED: A HISTORY OF THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT 6
(20'!7); see also Godsey, supra note 9, at 356 (tracing the origin of the innocence movement);
Marvin Zalman, An Integrated Justice Model of Wrongful Convictions, 7 4 ALB. L. REV. 1465,
1468 (2010--11) (defining the innocence movement).
12. Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1550 (2008); see also Robert
Carl Schehr, The Criminal Cases Review Commission as a State Strategic Selection
Mechanism, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1289, 1302 (2005).
13. See CCRC Our History, http:f/www.ccrc.gov.uk/about-us/our-history/ (last visited
Feb. 17, 2019).
14. See Lissa Griffin, International Perspectives on Correcting Wrongful Convictions:
The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1153, 1184
n.225.
15. Kent Roach, The Role of Innocence Commissions: Error Discouery, Systemic Reform
or Both? 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89, 9S-99 (2010).,
16. Sarah Lucy Cooper, Innocence Commissions in America: Ten Years After, in
CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 197, 200 (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed., 2014).
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of wrongful convictions and make recommendations for reform,17 no other
state has established a statewide error-correction commission like North
Carolina's. Rather, the fast-evolving favored entity in the United States
is the conviction-integrity unit (CIU) within local prosecutors' offices.
Since 2004, at least 33 local District Attorney's Offices have established
such units to investigate claims of innocence.is
In Canada, since 1989, several provinces have established limitedterm commissions to investigate the causes of wrongful convictions and
how they contributed to individual miscarriages ofjustice. 19 However, no
Canadian CCRC-type entity exists, nor have provincial prosecutors'
offices established CIUs. 20 Instead, the 'tertiary mechanism f6r
addressing wrongful convictions in Canada is review by the federal
Minister of Justice, who has the authority to order a new trial or refer
the matter to the Court of Appeal in the appropriate province or
territory. 21 In 2002, the Canadian Parliament amended the relevant laws
to make this authority more robust.2 2
The diversity of these approaches among countries that share basic
design features such as common law roots and an adversarial process
demonstrates that there is no single way to respond to the problem of
wrongful eonvictions. But the institutional responses are not random;
instead, they are reflective of the moment at which "innocence
consciousness"23 arose in each country and the legal systems and cultures
in which they exist. The remaining sections of this essay develop this
thesis in further detail. Part II discusses the sociological literature on
institutional change that provides the framework for this analysis. Part
III discusses the development of innocence commissions and related
institutions in the.U.K., the United States, and Canada. Finally, Part IV
discusses how this experience is consistent with tli'e theoretical
framework discussed in Part II, and the guidance it offers for those
17. See id. at 201-07.
18. NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2017, supra note 8, at 11.
19. See Roach, supra note 15, at 104-05.
20. See id. at 90.
21. See
Criminal
Conviction
Review,
CAN.
DEP'T
OF
JUST.,
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/ccr-rc/index.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).
22. See Andrea S. Anderson, Wrongful Convictions and the Avenues of Redress: The
Post-Conviction Review Process in Canada, 20 APPEAL: REV. CURRENT L. & L. REFORM 5, 9
(2015); Kerry Scullion, Wrongful Convictions and the Criminal Conviction Review Process
Pursuant to Section 696.1 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 46 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM.
JUST. 189, 192 (2004).
23. See Zalman, supra note 11, at 1468 (defining "innocence consciousness" as "the idea
that innocent people are convicted in sufficiently large numbers as a result of systemic
justice system problems to require efforts to exonerate them, and to advance structural
reforms to reduce such errors in the first place."),
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seeking to improve the existing mechanisms in these three countries as
well as reformers in.other parts of the world.
I. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
For decades, modern sociologists have studied how institutions
evolve 'in different settings to address similar needs. One of the leading
theories, institutional isomorphism, posits that organizational types tend
to spread, resulting in homogenous sti'uctures. 24 Although initially a
variety of institutional forms may develop to address a new problem, once
the "organizational field" in which those institutions operate becomes
"structured" or "well established," "there is an inexorable push toward
homogenization." 25 / An "organizational field" constitutes "those
organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of
institutional life" 26 -i.e., the "totality of relevant actors." 27 For example,
in the commercial arena, the "organizational field" for a particular
industry 'includes the ''key suppliers, resource and product consumers,
regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar
services or products."28 In the criminal justice arena, the organizational
field includes prosecutors, defense attorneys, the judiciary, legislators,
victims and the interested public.
An organiz~tional field is deemed "well established'' or "structured"leading to homogenization of institutional forms within it-when the
actors within the field are involved in regular interaction, develop
patterns and structures for those interactions, and develop a mutual
awareness that "they are involved in a common enterprise."29 This
process of "establishing'' or "structuring'' the field can be driven ,by
competition, government fiat, or the professions. 30 Once the field is
established, homogenization can be the result of different forces.
According to some theorists, competition drives that process-Le., the
"nonoptimal forms are selected out."3 1 Other theorists argue that the
process is more compl(lx, and can be the product of a desire on the part of

24. The seminal paper setting forth this theory is Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell,
The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in
Organizational Fields, 48 AM. Soc. REV. 147, 149-50 (1983).
25. Id. at 148.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 149 (citing Michael T. Hannan & John H. Freeman, The Population Ecology
of Organizations, 82 AM. J. OF Soc. 929 (1977)).
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organizations not only for "economic fitness" but also for institutional
legitimacy.32 Thus, once a particular organizational form becomes
recognized in the field, other firms will adopt it not necessarily because
it increases their efficiency, but because it enhances their perceived
legitimacy within the field.
While there is considerable empirical support for institutional
isomorphism, there is also ample support for the opposite--i.e.,
institutional divergence. More recent. scholarship has attempted to
reconcile these two realities by accounting for the circumstances in which
one or the other phenomenon will occur within a field. 33 It posits that, in
certain' circumstances, firms are likely to adopt a form that is already
well established within the field. 34 However, in othe:rcircumstances, they
are likely to adopt a different form. 85 Proponents of both institutional
isomorphism and the newer scholarship agree that certain mechanisms
play a role in determining whether homogenization is likely to occur.as
They include: (1) the exertion of power-i.e., has the state or some other
entity with coercive power demanded adoption of the form; (2)
attraction-i.e., is the form perceived as normatively attractive to the
would-be adopter, such that it chooses the form rather than having it
forced upon it; and (3) mimesis-i.e., does the adopter mimic the
established form, not because it finds the form normatively attractive but
as a way of compensating for uncertainty.37
Depending on the underlying conditions in a field-or in a nation,
when the nation is establishing a new institution looking to transnational
models-these mechanisms can exert greater or lesser force. ss For
example, when "existing institutions [in a region] have been thoroughly
discredited, morally or functionally, and, at the same time, if there is a
powerful external actor able to enforce a new institutional design,"39 it is
more likely that the region will adopt tM form preferred by the external
actor. 40 However, this force is mitigated by "domes.tic institutional
arrangements" and "cultural constraints."41 That is to say that, if the
preferred organizational form makes no sense in the cultural and social

Id. at 150.
See, e.g., Jens Beckert, Institutional Isomorphism Revisited: Convergence and
Divergence in Institutional Change, 28 Soc. THEORY 160, 161-52 (2010).
34. Id. at 156.
35. Id. at 156--57.
36. Id. at 164-55.
37. Id. at 152-59.
38. Id. at 153.
89. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 155.
32.
33.
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context of the adopting nation, it is unlikely to take hold, no matter how
strongly the external power-holder may seek to impose it. 42 Local
conditions serve as restraints on the power of attraction as a mechanism
of convergence. 43 Decision-makers will choose a form in existence
elsewhere only if it offers a solution that "fit[s] with other institutional
regulations prevailing in the specific setting,"44 and the nationa!:'frames
that embody a shared cultural understanding." 45 However, if decisionma.kers determine that a model does not fit with their local conditions
and frames, they are unlikely to adopt it and will look elsewhere. 46
;Finally, actors will mimic a model, even in conditions of uncertainty
th'at obfuscate the optimal soluti6n for them, if they perceive the model
as "instrumentally successful"47 in its home region and representative of
values they share. 48 By choosing a model that is perceived as successful
and consistent with the cultural identity they seek to project, the
decision-makers hope that their choice will be viewed as legitimate. 49
Mimicry also can be used as a tool of "distraction from authorship," 50
when the decision-makers "strategically want to downplay their role in
the design of institutional regulation," 51 as when the proposed design
could be' perceived as serving their partisan interests. 52
The emergence of a charismatic leader or collection of individuals can
also be a critical determinant of when and how reform comes about. 53
Particula'rly 'when the political conditions are favorable-which may
include when conditions are unstable-these individuals or groups can
"work to promote a frame that can make sense of the field in a new
way." 54 The most successful may find that their ideas become "widely
adopted," 55 not only helping to "resolve instability" but also becoming "the
perspective through which new decisions are made."56

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 154-55.
at 156.
at 156--57.
at 154-55.
at 158--59.
at 159.
at 158--59.
at 158.

at 153.
Elizabeth Popp Bermann, Explaining the Move Toward the Market in US Academic
Science: How Institutional Logics Can Change Without Institutional Entrepreneurs, 41
THEOR. Soc. 261, 262 (2012).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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II. THE ERROR-CORRECTION INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE
UNITED STATES, AND CANADA
,

A The United Kingdom
When the United Kingdom established the CCRC in 1995, it was a
pioneer in the field of error-correction institutions. 57 As a first-actor, it
did not have pther models to draw upon. The impetus for reform came
from a political crisis: the revelation that alleged Irish Republican Army
terrorists-including the so-called Guildford Four and the Birmingham
Six58-had been wrongly convicted and imprisoned for 15 years and 16
years, respectively, for bombings in the 1970s that they did not commit.59
Those wrongful convictions came to light not through DNA evidence, but
through the discovery of police documents that fatally undermined the
prosecution's case, including records supporting an alibi that were never
turned over to the defense and pre-prepared ,scripts from which the
detectives' allegedly contemporaneous notes of the defendants'
confessions appeared to have been copied.
On the very day in 1991 that the UK Court of Appeals quashed the
convictions of the Birmingham Six, Pai:liament established a: Royal
Commission to comprehensively review the criminal justice process in
England and Wales. 60 The Royal Comt,:iission also was charged with
making recommendations to restore public confidence in the system,
including the adequacy of appeal mechanisms. 6 1
57. See Griffin, supra note 14, at 1154.
58. See THE ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT,1.(1993) [hereinafter ROYAL
COMMISSION
REPORT],
https://www.gov.uk/governmentJuploads/system/uploads/attacbment_data/file/271971/226
3.pdf.
59. See Carole McCartney & Stephanie }ioberts, Building Institutio1&8 to Address
Miscarriages of Justice in England and Wales: 'Mission Accomplished'? 80 U. CIN. L. REV.
1333, 1345 (2012).
60. See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 58, at i-ii; McCartney & Roberts, supra
note 59, at 1340.
61. See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 58, at i-ii; McCartney & Roberts, supra
note 59, at 1340; see also JUSTICE COMMITTEE, CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION,
TwELFI'H REPORT OF SESSION 2014--2015, HC at 5 (UK) [hereinafter HOUSE OF COMMONS
REPORT]. In 1907, after decades of debate over whether there should be other more regular
means of review, Parliament enacted legislation authorizing the UK Court of Appeals to
hear criminal appeals and set aside convictions based on errors oflaw, insufficient evidence,
or any other grounds representing a "miscarriage of justice." See RoYAL COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 58, at 162; MICHAEL NAUGHTON, THE INNOCENT AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 144 (2013)
(citing the Criminal Appeal Act 1907 s.4(1)). Previously, there had been no judicial
appellate review of convictions for serious crimes in the United Kingdom; defendants
seeking relief could only petition the Home Secretary of the British Cabinet for a pardon-
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The Royal Commission released its report in 1993, recommending
numerous improvements in the conduct of police investigations. 62 The
Commission also recommended that the UK Court of Appeal review
convictions more liberally, particularly in cases in which the claim was
of factual error. 63 Finally, it recommended that a new independent body
be created 'to inv~stigate claims of wrongful conviction and refer the most
compelling cases to the Court of Appeal for consideration, 64 a function
then nominally performed by a Diviston 'of the Home Office but rarely
exercised. 66
In 1995: Parliament passed legislation adopting many, although not
all, of the changes recommended by the Royal Commission. The 1995 Act
adjusted the Court 'Of Appeals' standard of review to authorize the Court
to allow an appeal only when it found the conviction "unsafe."66 The
statute also created a new entity to review claims of wrongful conviction
and refer them to the Court of Appeals where it determined there was "a
real possibility that the conviction, verdict, finding or sentence would not
be upheld" under the "unsafe" standard.~7
That entity, the Criminal Case R'eview Commission (''CCRC"), began
operations in 1997 and continues'to this day. 68 It is a non-departmental
public body with significant full-time staff, funded by the Ministry of

a path that was seldom successful. Id.at 143. The 1907 statute was amended in 1966 and
1968, to focus on whether the conviction was "unsafe or unsatisfactory." Id. at 147-48.
Judges rarely set aside jury findings of guilt under any of these standards, especially in the
absence of "fresh evidence." See, e.g., Rosemary Pattenden, The Standards of Review for
Mistake of Fact in the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, CRIM. L. REV. 2009 1, 15-30 at
25 (2009).
62. See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 58.
63. See id., at 162-76.
64. Id. at 180-87. The recommendation to create such an entity was echoed in the
report prepared by a retired Court of Appeals judge who was commissioned to investigate
the police conduct in the Guildford Four case. See Terry Kirby, Guildford Four 'Plot'
Dismissed: An Inquiry into One of Britain's Worst Miscarriages of Justice Makes Many
Criticisms but Rejects the Idea of an Official Cover-Up, THE INDEPENDENT (July 1, 1994,
12:02 AM), https://www.independent.eo.uk/news/uk/guildford-four-plot-dismissed-aninquiry-into-one-of-britains-worst-miscarriages-of-justice-makes-1417469.html.
65. See HOUSE OF COMMONS REPORT, supra note 61, at 5 (explaining that "successive
Home Secretaries had been reluctant to refer cases, 'in part for fear that they would be
accused of interfering with the courts.").
66. Criminal Appeal Act 1995, c. 35, § 2 (Eng.). The Royal Commission had
recommended a broader standard-Le., that the Court should allow appeals when it
thought the conviction "is or may be unsafe." See HOUSE OF COMMONS REPORT, supra note
61, at 13 n.37.
67. Criminal Appeal Act 1995, c. 35, § 13(1)(a).
68. See
CCRC
Statistics,
CRIMINAL
CASES
REVIEW
COMMISSION,
http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/case•statistics (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).
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Justice. 69 By statute, one-third of its members must be lawyers, at least
two-thirds must have expertise in the criminal justice system,. 10 The
CCRC generally conducts its own investigations, which are inquisitorial
rather than adversarial. To assist in that process, the CCRC has the
statutory authority to compel public bodies to provide it with
information. 71 Per amendments enacted in 2016, it can apply to a Crown
Court for an order to obtain material fro~ priyate organizations or
individuals. 72 Although at one time a network of innocence projects at
universities in the UK helped present petitions to the CCRC, such
projects have dissipated in recent years. 73 In the twenty years since it
started operations in 1997, the OCRC has.reviewed \11-ore than 23,000
cases and made approximately 650 referrals to the Courts of Appeals, an
average of 33 cases a year. 74 In total, at least 433 of the cases referred by
the CCRC were successful, 76 yielding a "success rate" of approximately
69 percent. 76
Although it has its critics, the CCRC has widely been accepted in the
UK as a welcome improvement upon the pre-existing criminal justice
system. 77 Some of the most frequent criticisms have been that the CCRC
is too slow in processing cases and needs additional, and more certain

'

69. See CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS,
2016/17
11
(2017),
https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/ccrc-prod-storageljdn5dlf6iqll/uploads/2015/01/1096_WLT_Criminal-Cases-Review-AR_W ebAccessibleM1.pdf (UK). As of March 2017, the CCRC had 83 permanent members ofits staff Id. at 53.
70. Criminal Appeal Act 1995, c. 35, § 8(5)-(6) (Eng.).
71. Id. § 17(2).
72. See CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION, FORMAL MEMORANDUM: THE
COMMISSION'S POWER TO OBTAIN MATERIAL FROM PRIVATE BODIES AND INDMDUALS
UNDER 8.18A OF THE CRIMINAL APPEAL ACT OF 19ITTi (2016), http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/wpcontenUuploads/2015/01/FM-Section-l8A-CAAl995.pdf (UK). Prior to 2016, the CCRC's
inability to compel documents from private entities was repeatedly cited as a weakness in
its ability to perform effectively. See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS REPORT, supra note 61, at
• 4.
73. Zalman, Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective 19-20 (May 4, 2016) (on
file
with
author),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2899482 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2899482.
Presently,
the Innocence Network lists only one innocence project in the UK, at the University of
Greenwich School of Law in London. See Innocence Network Member Organizations,
INNOCENCE NETWORK, http://innocencenetwork.org/members/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).
74. CCRC
Statistics,
CRIMINAL
CASES'
REVIEW
COMMISSION
http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/case-statistics (last visited Feb. 17, 2019) (providing data current
through July 2018).
75. Id.
76. CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 69, at 7.
77. See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS REPORT, supra note 61, at 30 (noting that even the
CCRC's "strongest critics have said that they simply want it to improve"); McCartney &
Roberts, supra note 59, at 1347-48.
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funding.78 The most substantive challenge has been to the CCRC's
standard in screening cases. 79 Some critics have argued that.the CCRC
should be more aggressive in its referrals, and that its high "success" rate
is an indication that it is too conservative in referring cases to the Court
of Appeals. 80 Others have argued. that the CCRC's standards are
insufficiently protective, of the factually innocent, as opposed to those
whose cases suffer from procedural irregularities, of which the Court of
Appeals remains more likely to take note. 81 Another frequent criticism is
that the CCRC has not done enough to proactively improve the workings
of the criminal justice system on the front end. 82 That is, although the
CCRC may be fulfilling its mandate to correct miscarriages of justice that
have· already occurred, it has not conducted research or engaged in policy
advocacy to prevent future miscarriages of justice.83 In recent years, the
CCRC has acknowledged that it cannot take on this role due to limited
resources and has allowed outside scholars to conduct research using its
data.s4

B. The United States
The United States began to seriously grapple with wrongful
convictions in the early 2000s. 85 By 2002, 100 people had been exonerated
through DNA evidence in the United States, twenty-five in 2002 alone.es
North Carolina, which had experienced several high-profile DNA
exonerations, was the first to create a new institution to address wrongful
convictions. 87 In 2002, its Chief Justice-who was personally committed
to the cause of reform88-appointed a Commission to investigate the
78. HOUSE OF COMMONS REPORT, supra note 61, at 17-18.
79. Id. at 8-9; C. Ronald Huff & Michael Naughton, Wrongful Conviction Reforms in
the United States and the United Kingdom: Taking Stock, in CURRENT PROBLEMS OF THE'
PENAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 482, at 11 (Emil W. ·Plywaczewski & Ewa M. Guzik-Makarukeds., 2017) (criticizing CCRC's "real possibility" test because it ''literally handcuffs the
CCRC to the criteria of the appeal court for quashing convictions.").
80. See McCartney & Roberts, supra note 59, at 1348 (discussing the controversy over
the CCRC's success rate at the Court of Appeals).
81. Id. at 1350-52; see also Michael Naughton, Conclusion, in THE CRIMINAL CASES
REVIEW COMMISSION: HOPE FOR THE INNOCENT? 221, 222-23 (Michael Naughton ed., 2010).
82. Id. at 225.
83. HOUSE OF COMMONS REPORT, supra note 61, at 24-25.
84. Id. at 24.
85. Cooper, supra note 16, at 197.
86. See id.
87. See Cooper, supra note 16, at 200; see generally Robert P. Mosteller, N.C. Innocence
Inquiry Commission's First Decade: Impressive Successes and Lessons Learned, 94 N.C. L.
REV. 1725 (2016).
88. See JON B. GOULD, THE INNOCENCE COMMISSION: PREVENTING WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS AND RESTORING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 40 (2008) (noting the
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causes of wrongful convictions and make recommendations for reform. 89
The North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission (NCAIC) was the first
such panel in the United States and drew from constituencies across the
criminal justice system. 90 It concluded its work with proposals to improve
the conduct of investigations and review claims ofinnocence. 91 Among its
recommendations was the creation of a new state entity to investigate
claims of innocence like the British CCRc.02 With some modification,
that recommendation was adopted by the North Carolina legislature and
was signed into law by North Carolina's governor in August 2006,93'
The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission (NCIIC) started
its operations in 2006 with the authority to investigate claims of
innocence. 94 It has broad subpoena power, investigative t'esources, and
an inquisitorial process. 95 By statute, the Commission has eight voting
members, who consist of a superior court judge, a prosecutor, a victim
advocate, a criminal defense attorney, a sheriff, a non-lawyer, and two
additional members, who may be drawn from any sector. 96 The NCIIC is
an independent agency housed for .administrative purposes within the
Administrative Office of the North Carolina courts, with its own full-time
staff. 97 It operates on annual appropriated funds from the North Carolina
legislature and ~ants from the federal government. 98
important role in North Carolina's reform efforts by the state's then Chief Justice, I. Beverly
Lake); Christine C. Mumma, The •North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, in
WRONGFUL, CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 263 (Marvin
Zalman & Julia Carrano eds., 2014) C1t's impossible to overstate the importance of Chief
Justice Lake in the passing'' of the legislation creating the NCAIC.).
89. Symposium, The Role of Innocence Commissions: Error Discovery, Systemic Reform
or Both?, 85 CHI-KENT L. REV. 89, 110 (2010).
90. Cooper, supra note 16, at 200-Ql.
91. See id. at 201.
•"
92. Id. at 200.
98. See generally Mumma, supra note 88 (describing process of creating NCAIC).
94. Cooper, supra note 16, at 200.
95. See id. For example, a condition of submitting a claim to the Commission is that the
claimant waive all procedural safeguards and privileges. See N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 15A-1467(b)
(2015).
96. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1463(a) (2015); Cooper, supra note 16, at 200 n.87.
97. N.C.
INNOCENCE
INQUIRY
COMM'N,
2015
ANN.
REP. 1415, http://innocencecommission-nc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2015-annualreport.pdf. As of May 2018, the NCIIC had approximately eight full-time staff
members. See About, N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMMISSION, http://innocencecommissionnc.gov/about/#staff (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).
98. See N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMM'N, 2015 ANNuAL REPORT 14-15 (2016),
http://innocencecommission-nc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2015-annual-report.pdf.
The federal government has provided resources for states to engage in post-conviction DNA
testing through the federal Innocence Protection Act of 2001, which was reauthorized in
2016.
See N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMM'N, 2017 ANNuAL REPORT 5 (2018),
http://innocencecommission-nc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/2017-annual-report.pdf;
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The NCIIC may consider any claim supported by "some credible,
verifiable evidence of innocence that has not previously been presented
at trial or considered at a hearing granted through post-conviction
relief."99 After the Commission has completed its review, its voting
members vote on . whether to refer the case to a panel of three superior
.court judges for consideration. 100 For cases that went to trial, five of the
eight commissioners must agree that "there is sufficient evidence of
factual innocence to merit judicial review."101 If the case resulted in a
guilty plea, the commissioners' vote must be unanimous. For the threejudge panel to grant relief-dismissal of the charges-it must
unanimously agree that innocence has been.established by "clear and
convincing evidence."102
Since its inception in 2007, the NCIIC has reviewed more tlian 2,200
clai\ns, resulting in at least 10 exonerations.1°3 It has been widely praised
by scholars and seems to enjoy public support in the state, as reflected by
its continued annual appropriation. Like the CCRC,however, the NCIIC
has not been engaged in research and policy reform advocacy.
Despite the relative success of the NCIIC, no other state has adopted
a similar institution. This is despite that fact that several other states
have appointed panels to investigate the causes of wrongful convictions
and make recommendations for reform. 104 But most of these commissions
have not recommended the creation of a.new error-correction entity like
North C1;1.rolina's NCIIC or the UK's CCRC. For example, Florida's
Innocence Commission, established in 2010, explicitly avoided taking a
position on whether such an entity was desirable, stating in its final
report that whether to create such an entity was "left to the sound
discretion" of the three branches of state govemment. 105 And in Texas,
where the state legislature appointed a criminal justice task force in 2009
in the wake of the first posthumous DNA exoneration, and where

•

see also Barry C. Scheck, Conviction. Integrity Units Revisited, 14 Omo ST. J. CRIM. L. 705,
715 (2017) (discussing history of federal legislation to support DNA testing).
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 16A-1460(1) (2016). Unlike the CCRC, the NCIIC does not have
discretion to review cases lacking new evidence. In practice, the CCRC has rarely allowed
cases lacking such evidence. See Scheck, supra note 98, at 712 n.21.
100. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 16A-1469(a); see also N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMM'N, 2017
ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2018).
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1469(a).
102. Id.§ 15A-1469(h).
103. N.C. INNOCENC:ElNQUIRYCOMM'N, 2017 ANNUALREPORT 8 (providing data current
to Dec. 31, 2017).
rn4. See Cooper, supra note 16, at 201-06 (reviewing state systemic reform commissions,
•most of which have had limited terms).
105. FLA. INNOCENCE COMM'N, FINAL REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA 7
(2012), http://www.flcourts.org/core/fileparse.php/248/urltJinnocence-Report-2012.pdf.
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innocence reform had a dedicated leader in state government in State
Senator Rodney Ellis106-the Task Force did not recommend the creation
of a new entity. Instead, it made the far more modest recommendation
that the state "formalize" its relationships with the various innocence
projects at state law schools that received state funds, to require more indepth reports on the causes of identified wrongful convictions.1°7 That
recommendation was adopted by the state legislature in 2011. 10s
Instead of new independent entities, the mechanism for examining
innocence claims that has become diffuse in the United States is the
conviction-integrity unit (CIU) or Conviction Review Unit (CRU) within
local prosecutors' offices, which I will.refer to collectively as CIUs. The
first such office was created in 2004 in Santa Clara, California ap.d the
second in Dallas, Texas in 2007, 109 both the product of campaign promises
by newly elected District Attorneys in the wake of high-profile DNA
exonerations. 110 Since 2009, such units have proliferated. By the end of
2017, there were 33 such units around the country, with 18 of them
initiated since January 2014. 111 These offices still represent only a small
fraction of the over 2,300 local prosecutorial offices in the United States,
but such units have been established in many of the most populous
counties in the United States, 112 including, for example, Los Angeles
County in California (which at approximately ten million people, has
roughly the same population as the entire state of North Carolina), 113 and
in the Manhattan and Brooklyn District Attorney's Offices.114
Altogether, the CIUs in the United States are credited with having
helped to secure at least 269 exonerations from 2003 through 2017, with
more than eighty percent having occurred since 2014_115

106. See Cooper, supra note 16, at 205-06 (discussing leatlership of Texas State Senator
Rodney Ellis, Chairman of the Board of the Innocence Project, on innocence issues).
107. See id.
108. See TIMOTHY COLE EXONERATION REVIEW COMM'N, REPoRT TO TEXAS GOVERNOR
GREG ABBOTT, TEXAS LEGISLATURE AND TEXAS JUDICIAL COUNCIi, 10 (2016),
http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1436589/tcerc-final-report-december-9-2016.pdf (reporting
on implementation status of recommendations by panel appointed in 2009).
109. See John Hollway, Conviction Review Units: A National Perspective 13 n.5 (U. of
Pa. Law School Quattrone Ctr. for the Fair Admin. of Justice, Working Paper No. 2015-001,
2016) https://ssrn.com/abstract=2707809 [hereinafter Quattrone Center Report].
110. Id. at 16.
111. NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2017, supra note 8, at app.
tbl. A
112. Id. at 12.
113. Quattrone Center Report, supra note 109, at 34.
114. NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2017, supra note 8, at app.
tbl. A.
115. Id. at 2.
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Although the composition and structure of CIUs vary considerably,
so~ have dedicated professionals including prosecutors and
investigators. 11 6 Nevertheless, most CIU,s review cases only after
"defense attorneys, innopence organizations, journalists, or others" 117
have investigated them. Some have been widely praised by innocence
advocates, w:qile others have been derided as mere "window dressing,"
and othe,rs described as too new to assess. 118 Those deemed most
successful, and which have been, embraced by innocence advocates as
models, have brought in experienced defense attorneys to lead the CIUs
(as a unit separate and distinct from the office's appellate or habeas
units) and have .worked in partnership with. innocence projects. 119
Although the criteria they employ. in screening cases is rarely published,
the CIUs generally focus on credible claims of innocence-------,but with a
\\ willingness to consider some additional cases where it may be impossible
to establish factual innocence and yet a miscarriage of justice evidently
occurred. 120
The chief drawback of entrusting conviction integrity review to the
very same prosecutorial offices responsible for the convictions is
obvious-Le., that the office will invariably be biased. 121 Yet the potential
benefits of CIUs, if designed so as to minimize this risk, also are clear.
Not only will prosecutors have unparalleled access to necessary records
and vyitnesses (especially police witnesses), 122 but CIUs are far easier to·
set up than an independent entity like the NCIIC, which requires state
legislative action and additional appropriations. 123 The only person who

116. See iq. at 13.
117. Id. at 13; Quattrone Center Report, supra note 109, at 38-39 (describing many
CIUs' expressed preference for, and tendency to deem most credible, application that come
in through established innocence projects).
H.8. NAT'LREGISTRYOFEXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2015, at 15-16 (Feb. 3, 2016),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2015.pdf.
119. See, e.g., Scheck, supra note 98, at 738-741.
120. See id. at 734-38; see also Quattrone Center Report, supra note 109, at 35-41.
121. See NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2015, supra note 116, at
15-16; see also Daniel Kroepsch, Prosecutorial Best Practices Committees dnd Conviction
Integrity Units: How Internal Programs Are Fulfilling the Prosecutor's Duty to Serve Justice,
29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1095, 1105 (2016) ("[l]t can be difficult to convince prosecutors
that the [CIU]'s purpose is not to second-guess their work ....").
122. See Evelyn L. Malave & Yotam Barkai, Conviction Integrity Units: Toward
Prosecutorial Self-Regulation?, in MARVIN ZELMAN AND JULIA CARRANO, WRONGFUL
CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JQSTICE 189, 203 (2014) (noting that
one of the strengths of CIUS is that "prosecutors simply have greater access to information
than defense lawyers.").
123. See Mosteller, supra note 87, at 1733-35.
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must be convinced that the creation of a CIU is a good idea and a
worthwhile use of resources is the elected District Attorney. 124
So far, CIUs do not seem to be playing a major role in advocating for
reforms on the front-end of the criminal justice system. 125 Partly, this is
a limitation inherent in their relative novelty in many offices. 126 But like
the experience of the CCRC in the UK and the NCIIC in North Carolina,
it may be the product of an institution focusing its limited resources on
its primary mission-i.e., error correction in past cases.121 However,
there is optimism that CIUs, if they last, inevitably will have an impact
on the conduct of future cases by providing critical feedback to the rest of
the offices in which they reside. 128 And while innocence advocates still
occasionally call for the creation of independent entities lik~ the NCIIC
in other states, or a. federal commission to investigate wrongful
convictions, 129 they also have tentatively embraced CIUs, acknowledging
that they may be the most promising institution in the American
context. 130

C. The Canadian Experience
In Canada, we find a third model. Since 1989, the provincial
governments have appointed. several prominent commissions to
investigate notorious cases of wrongful convictions. 131 With one
exception, these commissions were appointed. after courts already had set
aside the convictions. 132 DNA played a role in some but not all of these
exonerations.1aa I'n many of these cases, as in the UK, the convictions
were overturned based on the discovery of egregious police misconduct
124. See NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN•2017, supra·note 8, at 15
(noting that the decision to create a CIU is an "internal organizational choice" for an elected
district attorney); see also Mosteller, supra note 87, at'l 735 (noting that the NCIIC was
created in 2006, just before the financial crisis).
125. See Quattrone Center Report, supra note 109, at 68.
126. See id. at 17 (surveying the relatively small number of units across the country),
127. See HOUSE OF COMMONS REPORT, supra note 61, at 24-25; Mosteller, supra note 87,
at 1735-36 (stating the focus of the NCIIC is "finding convicted defendants with credible
claims of actual innocence and resolving their claims.").
128. See Quattrone Center Report, supra note 109, at 69-70.
129. See, e.g., Scheck, supra note 98, at 710-11 (''Why, in 2017 are we even talking about
[CIUs] in district attorneys oft"ices" as opposed to "independent, well-funded government
entities" or '"public inquiry' tribunals ... ?").
130. See id. at 713 (expressing optimism that well-run CIUs "may have a surprisingly
good chance of succeeding.;.
131. See Roach, supra note 15, at 105.
132. See id.
133. See, e.g., Steven Skurka, A Canadian Perspective on the Role of Cooperators and
Informants, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 761 (2002) (discussing DNA exoneration of Guy Paul
Morin in 1996, leading to the appointment of the Morin commission).
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that thoroughly undermined the defendant's guilt. 134 These inquiries
typically have been conducted by sitting or retired judges, and have
resulted in the publication of reports making factual findings about what
occurred in the individual cases that prompted the commission as well as
recommendations to improve the criminal justice system. 135 Most of the
recommendations of the commissions have not been enacted into law by
the federal Parliament, which has exclusive authority over criminal law
in Canada. 136
Since 1989, at least six of these commission~ have recommended the
creation of an independent entity like the CCRC to review claims of
wrongful conviction and refer them back to the courts for
consideration. 187 But to date, this recommendation has not been adopted
and no such entity exists in Canada. 1sa Instead, Canada has a mechanism
whereby a person can contest a conviction (after exhausting all appellate
review) 139 by applying directly to the federal Minister of Justice 140 to reopen the conviction if there has been a miscarriage of justice-which like
in the UK, is broader than a claim offactual innocence.141
In 2002, the Canadian federal Parliament adopted reforms to this
mechanism in response to some of the criticiE\ms that had been lodged
against it. 142 Thus, under the current Canadian framework, an individual
may petition the Minister of Justice to review a conviction for a
miscarriage of justice,148 The Minister maintains an office charged with
investigating such claims, known as the Criminal Conviction Review
Group (CCRG). 144 If, based upon the recommendations of the CCRG, the
134. Kent Roach & Gary Trotter, Miscarriages of Justice in the War against Terror, 109
PENN ST. L. REV. 967; 980 (2005).
.

,t,

135. See Roach, supra note 15, at,105.
136. See Kent Roach, An Independent Commission to Review Claims of Wrongful
Convictions: Lessons from North Carolina?, 58 CRIM. L. Q. 283, 293 (2012).
137. See id. at 283, 291-92.
138. See id. at 291-92.
139. Since 1923, criminal defendants in Canada have been able -to appeal their
convictions to appellate courts. See Clive Walker & Kathryn Campbell, The CCRC as an
Option for Canada: Forwards or Backwards?, in THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW
COMMISSION: HOPE FOR THE INNOCENT? 191-192 (Michael Naughton ed., 2010) (describing
system of appeals in Canada).
140. The federal Minlster of Justice also serves as Canada's Attorney General and Chief
Prosecutor. See id. at 196.
141. See Roach, supra note 136, at 291-92.
142. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 § 696.1 (Can.).
143. See id. § 696.1(1).
144. The CCRG was first formed within the Canadian Ministry of Justice in 1993,
following an internal review of the process for reviewing applications alleging miscarriages
of justice. See Anderson, supra note 22, at 9. The CCRG has approximately six full-time
staff. See HELENA KATZ, JUSTICE MISCARRIED: INSIDE WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN CANADA
15 (2011).
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Minister determines that "there is a reasonable basis to conclude that a
miscarriage of justice likely occurred," 145 the Minister can order a new
trial or refer a case to the court of appeal of the province or territory to
consider as if on appeal. 146 In making that determination, the Minister
may take into account any relevant evidence, including whether the
application is "supported by new matters of significance that were not
considered by the courts ...."147 The Minister has subpoena power to
collect evidence to investigate the claim. 148 In a concession to critic~,who
claimed that the Minister of Justice could not be sufficiently impartial,
the Minister also now has the authority to delegate investigation of
claims to an outside independent adviser. 149 By regulation, the CCRG
also is required to be physically separated from the traditional law
enforcement operations of the Ministry. 150 Lawyers with innocence
projects at several Canadian law schools, 151 and with Innocence
Canada, 152 a not-for-profit innocence organization founded in 1993, assist
some petitioners with their cases.153
Since the 2002 reforms went into effect, the CCRG has referred at
least 13 cases to the courts out of a total of at least 86 applications on
which the Minister rendered a decision. 154 This is a higher rate ofreferral
than either the CCRC or the NCIIC, but out of a much smaller pool of
applications. 155 The cases referred by the Canadian Minister of Justice
enjoy a high success rate: put of the 13 referred, all but two resulted in a
..,,,
145. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 § 696.3(3)(a) (Can.). This standard has been
interpreted in a manner consistent with "the English standard that focuses on the safety of
convictions as opposed to proven innocence." See Kent Roach, Wrongful Convictions in
Canada, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1465, 1497 (2012).
146. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 § 696.3(3)(a) (Can.).
147. See id. § 696.4(a).
148. See id. § 696.2(2).
149. See id. § 696.2(3); see, e.g., Anderson, supra note 22, at 12 (describing the issue of
impartiality with regard to the Minister as "chief lawmaker ... too close to the prosecution
of a case to render an impartial decision" on post-conviction review).
150. See Anderson, supra note 22, at 9.
151. See Alphabetical Listing of all Innocence Network Member Organizations,
INNOCI!)NCE NETWORK, http://innocencenetwork.org/members/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2019)
(listing organizations at two Canadian law schools).
152. See Frequently Asked Questions, INNOCENCE CANADA (FORMERLY THE ASSOCIATION
IN
THE
DEFENCE
OF
THE
WRONGLY
CONVICTED
OR
AIDWYC),
http://www.innocencecanada.com/frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).
153. About Us, INNOCENCE CANADA, www.innocencecanada.com/about-us/ (last visited
Feb. 17, 2019).
154. Roach, supra note 136, at 289.
155. Id.
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favorable outcome-either in court or at the discretion of the
prosecutor. 156
Despite the 2002 reforms, critics still contend that this process is
insufficiently independ'ent because the final decision as to whether to
refer a •case back to the courts lies with a law enforcement official. 157 In
addition, the Canadian process has been criticized as characterized by
undue delay,·unreasonable burdens imposed upon petitioners, and a lack
of transparency. 158 •Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any
significant movement presently in Canada to revisit the structures in
effect. 169
t'
III. RECONCILING THE LIVED EXPERIENCE WITH THE THEORY OF
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

So why have the United Kingdom, The United States, and Canada,three countries that share common law roots and an adversarial legal
system-all developed such different institutions to address wrongful
convictions? Why didn't the CCRC model for error correction, once
adopted in the UK and (with some modification) in North Carolina,
become diffuse in the United States and in Canada? Why has the CIU
model spread so quickly in the United States, but not in Canada? The
theoretical literature on institutional development offers some helpful
insights in solving these puzzles.
To begin, the UK's adoption of an entirely new institutional entity
makes sense in the context in which the CCRC's authorizing legislation

156. Id. at 290. See also Fiona Leverick et al., Post-Conviction Review: Questions of
Innocence, Independence, and Necessity, 47 STETSON L. REV. 45, 60 (2017) (describing high
success rate of CCRG, but in context of relatively small pool of applications).
157. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 22, at 11; Scullion, supra note 22, at 192 (describing
frequent criticisms); INNOCENCE CAN., REPORT FROM THE WRONGFUL CONVICTION ROUND
TABLE: THE FuTURE OF INNOCENCE WORK AS PART OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM REVIEW 8 (2017), http://innocencecanada.com/assets/Uploads/WrongfulConviction-Round-Table-Report.pdf (recommending that Canada's federal government
create a publicly-funded, independent innocence commission like the UK's CCRC to cure a
perception that the CCRG lacks independence); James Lockyer, The Need for a Criminal
Cases Review Commission in Canada for the Wrongly Convicted, Book of Materials for
Consideration by the Liberal Party of Canada, INNOCENCE CAN. 12-13 (Oct. 2015),
http://www.innocencecanada.com/assets/Uploads/James-Lockyer-prepares-letter-to-thePrime-Minister. pdf.
158. See Clive Walker & Kathryn Campbell, The CCRC as an Option for Canada:
Forwards or Backwards?, in THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION: HOPE FOR THE
INNOCENT? 191, 196 (Michael Naughton ed., 2010); Anderson, supra note 22, at 11; Roach,
supra note 136, at 288.
159. Anderson, supra note 22, at 24.
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was enacted.160 The country was in political turmoil, with the adequacy
and moral legitimacy of its existing criminal justice apparatus seriously
called into doubt.161 The time was ripe for significant change. The CCRC
also must be understood in the context of the ongoing effort to define the
scope of appellate review in criminal cases in the UK, which historically
has been far more limited than in the United States.162 The CCRC's
mandate to investigate "unsafe convictions" (not just cases of factual
innocence) also reflects the circu�stances of its creation, which involved
the discovery of egregious police misconduct rather than the results of
DNA testing.163 The CCRC's structure as a publicly funded nationwide
body also makes sense in the context of the UK, where most climinal la w
_
enforcement , and prosecution is centralized under a single prosecutmg
authority. 164
Wheh North Carolina acted a decade later, it too was responsive to
the political situation on the: ground. Consistent with the circumstances
in which North Carolina's innocence consciousness arose, which involved
DNA exonerations, the NCIIC focuses on claims of factual inn ocence-165
But its structure, as an independent but state-funded entity, borrows
heavily (and self-consciously so) from the �CRC model.166 Some
.combination of attraction and mimicr,y appear to have been at work when
the North Carolina commission recommended that structure, with the
choice representing values that North Carolina wished to project.167 The
strong leadership of North Carolina's Chief Justice in pushing for major
reform also clearly was an important factor.
.
.
However, the CIU's emergence as the preferred model in the U�1ted
States suggests that the CCRC-type entity is not in fact the opt�m?-1
structure for the American criminal justice system. Although it is
tempting to attribute the CIU's triumph over the CCRC-type entity to a
160. See McCartney & Roberts, supra note 59, at 1342-46.
161. See McCartney & Roberts, supra note 59, at 1345.
.
.
l62. See Craig Bradley, The Prosecutor's Role: Plea Bargaining and Evide":tiary
Exclusion, in THEPROSECUTORINTRANSNATIONALPERSPECTIVE 91 (Erik Luna & Ma�a�ne
L. Wade eds., 2012) (noting differences between the United States' diffuse criminal Justice
system and the unified system of England and Wales).
163. HOUSE OF COMMONS REPORT, supra note 61, at 24-25.
164- See Bradley, supra note 162, at 91; Our Organization, CROWN PROSECUTION
SERVICE, http://www.cps.gov.uk/your_cps/our_organisation/index.html ( last visited Feb. 17,
2019).
165. See Mosteller, supra note 87, at 1731.
166. See id. at 1736-37.
,
l67. See Mumma, supra note 88, at 252-5 4, 263 (describing impact of the C';m_c 8
example on the NCAIC, including a presentation by a CCRC member to the commission
charged with making recommendations to the state legislature).
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lack of state resources after the financial crisis, political expediency or
cynicism on the part of prosecutors, those explanations do not adequately
account for the ways in which the CIU in fact fits better with existing
institutional arrarlgements and cultural frames in the United States.
That is, ih the United States, we are accustomed to granting enormous,
effectively unsupervised power to local prosecutors168-far more so than
in the United Kingdom, where prosecution is centralized under the
command of the Crown Prosecution Service and there is a single criminal
procedure code. 169 These aspects of the American system of prosecution
may represent th� very reason claims of innocence ought to be
investigated by an entity independent of the original prosecutorial office,
but tll,ey also explain why such an arrangement creates institutional and
cultural dissonance.
The diffusion of innocence projects throughout the United States also
makes the CIU model feasible as a practical matter. Whereas the
investigatory work performed by the CCRC in the UK is funded by
"Parliament, in the United States these tasks effectively can be
outsourced to private entities.17o As Kent Roach has noted, in the United
'States, "[e]rror correction . . . is essentially privatized and based on
volunteer work."171 This arrangement is consistent with what Marvin
·Zalman has describea as "the American path by which ideological
interests ... are represented by thousands of civil society interest groups
rather than by parliamentary parties," operating ''in a polity
distinguished by federalism and political fragmentation . . . organized
primarily at the state or local level."172 In the United Kingdom, by
contrast, the civiJ society infrastructure necessary to sustain localized,
privately funded'investigation and advocacy appears to be considerably
less robust.173
168. See David A. Harris, The Interaction and Relationship Between Prosecutors and
Police Officers in the United States, and How This Affects Police Reform Efforts, in THE
PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 54,58 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds.,
2012) (noting that local district attorneys in the United States exercise their power "with

complete independence from any other prosecuting authority" and neither report to, nor
feel constrained by, either the state or federal Attorney General (citing Yale Kamisar,
Wayne R. LaFave, and Jerold H. Israel, Grand Jury Review, in MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 18 (12th ed. 2008))).
169. Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade, Introduction to Adversarial and Inquisitorial
Systems-Distinctive Aspects and Convergent Trends, in THE PROSECUTOR IN
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 177, 184-85 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012).
170. See Bradley, supra note 162, at 94; Roach, supra note 15, at 119.
171, See Roach, supra note 15, at 119.
172. Zalman, supra note 73, at 14-15.
173. See id. at 18-20 (explaining the demise of most of the Innocence Project network
affiliates in United Kingdom, in favor of efforts residing within the judicial system,
including the CCRC).
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That some CIUs have now gained legitimacy in the eyes of innocence
advocates provides additional reason to believe that the form will
dominate the innocence field in the United States. As that field becomes
more structured, prosecutors newly entering it may seek legitimacy for
their own error-correction efforts by mimicking their peers. Absent some
new political crisis demonstrating that CIUs are inadequate to address
the problem of wrongful convictions, it seems unlikely that the current
trend (favoring CIUs over NCIIC/CCRC-type entities) will shift in the
foreseeable future. As scholars with the National Registry of
Exonerations recently observed, "[t]he number of CIUs will probably
continue to increase at a steady pace" in part because "[t]hey have become
an accepted component of the American system of criminal justice."174 In
addition, that CIUs have become "politically popular'' helps explain why
prosecutors seeking election have embraced them.
Canada's experience also is consistent with this theoretical
framework. There, despite calls by several prominent commissions for a
centralized error-correction independent entity like the CCRC, no such
entity has been created. 175 Perhaps Canada has not yet suffered a crisis
of faith in its criminal justice system severe enough to force more
substantial reform, or maybe the requisite leadership on the national
stage has not yet emerged. The reform commissions' appointment by
provincial authorities, rather than the federal government, also may
have undercut their effectiveness in securing national change, as might
have their failure to include more prosecutors and law enforcement
officials in their membership. 176 That is, to have maximum morai and
persuasive force, it may be necessary to havfµl mandate directly from the
authority that will be asked to enact th'.e recommended reforms, and to
credibly speak on behalf of all affected constituencies. 177
Why also haven't we seen the emergence of CIUs in provincial
prosecutors' offices in Canada? It may be that the CIU is not well suited
to institutional arrangements and cultural frames in Canada. Unlike in
the United States, criminal law in Canada is strictly a matter of federal
174.

See NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,

EXONERATIONS IN 2017,

supra note 8, at

21.

175. See Roach, supra note 136, at 291-92.
176. See Roach, supra note 145, at 1474; INNOCENCE CANADA, supra note 154, at 7
(observing that the Canadian federal government may have "paid scant attention" to
recommendations by prior commissions and public inquiries to create an indep~ndent
national commission to investigate wrongful convictions because they were "created by
various provinces" rather than the federal government).
177. See INNOCENCE CANADA, supra note 153, at 7 (arguing that rather than innocence
advocates presenting "a finely-tuned proposal ,detailing precisely how a free-standing
commission could be set up," it would be preferable for Canada's Minister of Justice to select
a qualified individual to "canvas all sides" and report back with recommendations).

1166

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 70:1143

law, and the criminal justice systems of the provinces and the federal
government are more integrated. 178 Canada's prosecutors and judges also
are all a.ppoihted rather than elected.179 Thus, Canada's provincial
prosecutors, who need not seek election, may not. feel any, political
pressure to embrace past error, correction as part of the mandate of their
individual office~. Moreover, because Canadian provincial prosecutors do
not have the same tradition of complete local independence as do
American local prosecutors, it may not be so dissonant to assign
responsibility to investigate miscarriages of justice, including those that
occurred in the course of prosecutions brought by provincial authorities,
to the federal Minister of Justice .

•

CONCLUSION

As the international innocence movement continues to grow,
countries around the world will have to decide whether and how to reexamine past convictions for error. The experiences of the United
Kingdom, the United States, and Canada-three countries much in
common-demonstrate that there are at least several possible models for
how such error-correction may be approached. Sociological theory
suggests that as the "innocence field" becomes more established
internationally, one or more of these institutional types may come to
dominate the field, or we may yet see the emergence of others. Which
institutions and mechanisms are most likely to be embraced in a given
country will depend on a variety of factors, including the circumstances
in which innocence consciousness arises therein, whether there are
strong leaders committed to a particular model, and the pre-existing
institutional arrangements and cultural frames in that nation.

178. See Roach, supra note 146, at 1466 (noting that "criminal law and procedure is
exclusively a matter of federal jurisdiction in Canada" and Canada's policing and forensic
science system is "much more centralized" than in the United States).
·
179. Id.

